Election 2006 saw a major, significant collapse of the PAP's electoral tactics in Hougang and Potong Pasir.Way before the election mechanism was set in place, the PAP saw it as a major election objective to re-capture Hougang and especially Potong Pasir. They promised everything from upgrading to funds to "committed' PAP candidates to serve and reward the residents of the Hougang and Potong Pasir if the PAP gets voted into power.
On the day before voting day, SM Goh Chok Tong even put everything on the line by promising S$100m and S$80m to Hougang SMC and Potong Pasir SMC respectively.The difference between Election 2006 and the past elections is this: The PAP was so confident of victory in Potong Pasir that Mr Lim Boon Heng, Chairman of the People's Action PArty declared that winning 83 out of 84 will be a good showing for the Prime Minister way before voting day itself. SM Goh, who was tasked by the PM Lee to re-capture Potong Pasir and Hougang, commented that
victory in Potong Pasir is highly likely; Hougang might prove to be more of a challenge.
There's good reason for the top echleon of the PAP to feel this way. The winning margin of the incumbent Chiam See Tong had been diminishing with every passing election. The battle for Potong Pasir went as close as 52% to 48% in favour of the opposition in the 2001 general election. From the perspective of the PAP and the rest of Singapore, Mr Chiam See Tong have been the MP for the last 25 years and not much materials improvements was made to the living environment in Potong Pasir.
On top of that, Mr Chiam is ageing and the committment, energy and passio level was questioned repeatedly by the PAP. (If the Lee Kuan yew at the age of 83, is still very much involved in the government as the Minister Mentor, the author find the accusation of the PAP as rather baseless and illogical).
Fast forward to the night when the election results was announced. Not much surprises in the opposition camp. The opposition kept Hougang SMC and Potong Pasir SMC and lost every other seat contested across the island. The most stunning aspect of the results, however was this.
Mr Low Thia Khiang and Mr Chiam See Tong improved on their winning margins by 7% and 3% respectively. An interesting phenomenon indeed.
Personally, the author believes that this result came as a total surprise to the entire leadership of the PAP.The question of "what happens" was on the lips of the PAP and its supporters, but obviously it was made in a subtle manner. The PAP stayed cool in the face of the result and insisted that winning out of 84 seats was a very good result (Was that what they say before the election?)
and the focus in the maintream media was on the strong mandate that Singaporeans gave to the PAP leadership.
The author put forward this argument. The PAP believes that the snatching of Potong Pasir from the opposition was within sight and major headways will be made in Hougang. In this instance, it is reasonable to argue that the PAP's election tactics and agenda in the opposition-controlled ward of Hougang and Potong Pasir was not in sync with the voters in Hougang and Potong Pasir and had thus failed on a substantial level. Basically, they couldn't find the appropriate wavelength to reach out to the residents in the Hougang and Potong Pasir.Thus, it was not surprising to see the PAP reviewing its electoral tactics in Hougang and Potong Pasir in such a short span of time after the election, with SM Goh once again spearheading the review. The seriousness that the PAP placed on this issue further reinforced the author's argument.
It signal a colossal setback to the PAP leadership and the PAP would find it even more diffcult to pry Hougang and Potong Pasir away from the opposition in the next election due in 2011. This could very well signal the first indication of a complete entrenchment of opposition power in Hougang and Potong Pasir.